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We analyze the coverage of U.S. political scandals by U.S. newspapers during the past decade. Using
automatic keyword-based searches we collected data on 35 scandals and approximately 200 newspapers.
We ˝nd that Democratic-leaning newspapers -- i.e., those with a higher propensity to endorse Democratic
candidates in elections -- give relatively more coverage to scandals involving Republican politicians
than scandals involving Democratic politicians, while Republican-leaning newspapers tend to do the
opposite. This is true even when controlling for the average partisan leanings of readers. In contrast,
newspapers appear to cater to the partisan tastes of readers only for local scandals.
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In modern societies the mass media are citizens' most important source of information about
public aairs. On some issues, such as crime or the state of the economy, citizens can compare
the news provided by the media with their personal experience. On other issues, such as
foreign aairs, the media are the only source of information available to most of the public.
Events concerning the malfeasance of public ocials typically fall into the second cate-
gory. Politicians may wish to communicate directly with voters about certain matters, such
as popular policy decisions, but they clearly have no incentive to advertise their wrongdo-
ings. As a result, the mass media have the potential to play a crucial role as watchdogs,
informing citizens about any improper conduct by those in power.
Of course, in practice the media might or might not serve as faithful watchdogs. In
particular, according to the \agenda-setting" theory of mass media, editors and journalists
enjoy considerable freedom in deciding what is newsworthy and what is not, and these
choices aect the perception of citizens about which issues are relevant and to what extent.
As pointed out by Lippmann [1922], events regarding public aairs would be \out of reach,
out of sight, out of mind" for citizens if the media happen not to cover them.
In this paper we investigate the coverage of political scandals by approximatively 200
U.S. newspapers during the last decade. We collect data on media coverage through auto-
mated keyword-based searches of the NewsLibrary electronic archive, and focus on scandals
involving senators, members of congress, and state governors. Exploiting the newspapers'
own archives and the Factiva electronic archive we integrate our dataset with similar infor-
mation on the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune. We use
this data to test several hypothesis regarding the political behavior of mass media. We match
this data with a measure of the explicit partisan position of each newspaper, and a measure
of the partisanship of each newspaper's readers. The former is the average propensity to
endorse Democratic versus Republican candidates in congressional and statewide races, and
3the latter is the propensity to vote for Democratic versus Republican candidates in the areas
in which each newspaper is sold, weighted by circulation. We also use the circulation data
to construct measures of the competitiveness of each newspaper market.
The main nding of our analysis is that the ideological position on the \supply side"
is strongly correlated with the partisan coverage of scandals, and with the expected sign.
Democratic-leaning newspapers { i.e., those with a higher propensity to endorse Democratic
candidates in elections { give signicantly more coverage to scandals involving Republican
politicians than scandals involving Democratic politicians, while Republican-leaning news-
papers do the opposite. This bias in coverage of scandals is not conned to the editorial
page, but also aects the news section.1
On the other hand, we nd that \demand side" factors play a signicant role only for local
scandals. Newspapers mainly read in Democratic (Republican) areas give signicantly more
coverage to Republican (Democratic) scandals, but only when the politicians involved in the
scandal are from the same state or congressional district where the newspaper is sold. This
dierence in coverage does not hold for \distant" scandals. In contrast, the supply side eect
described in the previous paragraph { that Republican-endorsing newspapers systematically
give more coverage to Democratic scandals, and Democratic-endorsing newspapers do the
opposite { holds irrespective of the geographical location of the politicians involved.
The relative frequency of stories about political scandals is on average quite small. Thus,
in absolute terms the eects we measure are also small. In relative terms, however, the biases
are large. Consider a newspaper with a propensity to endorse Democratic candidates that
is one standard deviation higher than average. On average, this newspaper would devote 26
percent more coverage to Republican scandals over Democratic scandals. To have a rough
idea of the relative positions, a standard deviation in the endorsement score is what separates
1Although the relationship between endorsement behavior and readers' partisanship is positive and sta-
tistically signicant, the correlation is rather low, only about .28. Thus, there is evidently a lot of \slack"
between the partisan positions of readers and the editorial stances of newspapers. This suggests that the
endorsement behavior of a given newspaper is a reasonable indicator of \supply side" forces pinning down
its editorial position. We discuss this in more detail in section 3 below.
4the Chicago Tribune from the Denver Post, and in turn the Denver Post from the New York
Times.
Finally, there is some evidence that newspapers with larger circulation systematically
give more space to scandals, irrespective of the political aliation of those involved. As
discussed below, there are both demand-driven and supply-led accounts consistent with this
relationship.
The paper is organised as follows: in the next section we survey the theoretical and
empirical literature on the determinants and measurement of mass media bias. In section 3
we describe the data and in section 4 we give a preliminary look at them through a two-stage
analysis. Section 5 presents the results obtained from a one-stage procedure with interaction
terms, together with some robustness checks, while section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Theory
What determines the amount of media coverage devoted to political scandals? On the sup-
ply side, stakeholders such as owners, editors and journalists might pursue partisan agendas.
In this case, Democratic-leaning newspapers would extensively cover scandals involving Re-
publican politicians, and devote less coverage to those involving Democratic politicians.
Republican-leaning newspapers would do the opposite. Gentzkow et al. [2006] develop a
simple model of ideological newspapers. A newspaper can pay a cost to investigate and
acquire a newsworthy \story", but it will not publish the story if it conicts with the news-
paper's political leaning. The incentives to pay the costs of investigation depend on the
incentives to suppress unfavorable stories, which depend in turn on how much advertising
and circulation revenue would be lost by not publishing them.
The role played by the demand side depends on whether readers consume news in order
to acquire information or to conrm their prior beliefs. Conrmation-seeking readers might
enjoy reading about scandals involving politicians on the opposite side of the political spec-
5trum, and dislike reading about scandals involving politicians from their preferred side. In
this case, to the extent there is a partisan or ideological match between the consumers and
suppliers of news, the supply side and demand side forces both push news coverage in the
same direction.2
Media outlets may have an incentive to slant coverage even if consumers are purely
information-seeking. Gentzkow and Shapiro [2006] show that media outlets will tend to
report news in a manner consistent with their readers' prior beliefs in order to build and
maintain a reputation for high-quality journalism.3
On the other hand, if the demand for information drives news consumption and the deci-
sions made by consumers are discrete choices (e.g., casting a vote for one of two parties), then
only individuals that can be induced to change their course of action should be interested in
acquiring the information. Ideologically moderate and independent citizens should therefore
have stronger incentives to obtain information than ideological extremists and loyal parti-
sans. While each new piece of news is potentially useful to moderates, almost no amount
of news could change an extremist's behavior.4 This suggests that newspapers that appeal
to moderates or independents should tend to cover all political scandals, irrespective of the
political aliation of the politicians involved.
Another issue is newspaper size. It is unclear a priori whether newspapers circulating
in a large city should devote more overall coverage to political scandals than newspapers
in smaller cities. Suppose that (i) readers are conrmation seekers who like to read about
scandals involving politicians from the opposition party, and (ii) larger audiences tend to be
more ideologically heterogeneous or more diverse in terms of partisanship. Then, as long as
2Mullainathan and Shleifer [2005] build a game-theoretical model of news consumption in which readers
are willing to pay for ideologically consonant coverage. In our context, readers would be willing to pay for
the omission of facts that conict with their priors.
3In the Gentzkow and Shapiro [2006] model newspapers sometimes make mistakes, and some newspapers
are more likely to make mistakes than others. Readers have prior beliefs about what is more likely to be true
and what is not, and are also uncertain about the quality of their newspaper. They then update their beliefs
in a Bayesian fashion based on what they read. The results are similar in spirit to those on \pandering" in
Canes-Wrone et al. [2001].
4See Larcinese [2006] for a model yielding this type of prediction.
6readers can simply skip over the articles covering scandals involving politicians from their
preferred ideology or party (or do not dislike reading these articles too much), a newspaper
catering to the larger audience is likely to nd it protable to cover scandals involving both
parties' politicians, and hence will devote more coverage overall to scandals. That is, a
newspaper that initially covered only Republican scandals would increase its prots if it
decided to cover Democratic scandals as well, because it would gain more readers among
Republicans than it would lose among Democrats. There is also an obvious supply side
factor { newspapers with larger circulation also have more resources, and might choose to
assign more sta to investigative reporting and coverage of scandals.
A nal issue is competition. There are several reasons why the amount of competition
faced by media outlets could aect the level and bias in the coverage of scandals. If media
bias is driven mainly by the ideological leaning of journalists and editors, then a more
competitive media market is likely to mitigate the degree of bias. A partisan newspaper
enjoying a local monopoly can unabashedly disregard those scandals involving politicians
from its preferred party. On the other hand, in the presence of competitors, each newspaper
might be induced to devote some attention to scandals on both sides, in order not to lose
readers, and revenue, to other newspapers that do. Competition might also interact with
demand-side factors. The Mullainathan and Shleifer [2005] model predicts that competition
may increase the amount of \bias" (ideological dierentiation) in media coverage.5 On the
other hand, the Gentzkow and Shapiro [2006] model predicts the opposite.6
5In their model a monopolistic newspaper will position itself in the middle of the ideological spectrum of
its market area, while in a duopoly situation the newspapers would locate on opposite sides of the middle,
each carving out a part of the readership for itself.
6In their model, increased competition tends to reduce the bias (increase the accuracy) of each newspaper.
The reason is that with a larger number of media outlets readers will typically have access to follow-up stories
that investigate the accuracy of prior stories (\scoops"). So newspapers ex ante face stronger incentives to
report in an unbiased fashion.
72.2 Previous empirical studies
There is a growing empirical literature which attempts at nding replicable and intuitive
measures of the ideological position of media outlets.
One straightforward way to do this is to investigate the explicit political behavior of
media outlets, e.g. their endorsements in races for political oces.7 Ansolabehere et al.
[2006] analyze the political orientation of endorsements by U.S. newspapers in statewide and
congressional races, using a panel data design. They nd an upward trend in the average
propensity to endorse one or the other major-party candidate. They also nd a particularly
large increase in the propensity to endorse incumbents. Finally, they nd a clear change in
the average partisan slant of endorsements. In the 1940s and 1950s Republican candidates
enjoyed a strong advantage in newspaper endorsements. This advantage gradually eroded
in subsequent decades, so that by the 1990s there was a slight tendency for newspapers to
endorse Democrats (even controlling for incumbency).
One might instead be concerned about the implicit political behavior of media outlets.
Potentially, this is a more insidious way for media outlets to act politically, since readers and
viewers might not be entirely aware of the bias to which they are being exposed.
There are two broad approaches used to estimate this implicit ideological stance. In the
rst approach, mass media outlets are classied on the basis of the resemblance between
what they report and what political actors of a known ideological position do.
Groseclose and Milyo [2005] classify U.S. media outlets by tracing out which think tanks
are quoted by each of them. The political leaning of each think tank is recovered by looking
at the political position (ADA score) of members of the U.S. Congress who quote the same
think-tank in a non-negative way. In a nutshell, the political leaning of each outlet can then
be calculated as the average ideology of quoted think-tanks. They nd that all the outlets
in their sample { except Fox News Special Report and the Washington Times { are located
7This is of course feasible only in a context where media outlets routinely endorse candidates in electoral
races.
8to the left of the average Congress member. At the same time, all outlets but one (the
Wall Street Journal) are located between the average Democrat and the average Republican
Congressmen, hence displaying a high degree of centrism.8
Gentzkow and Shapiro [2007] provide another measure of media bias based on similarities
between the language used by media outlets and congressmen. Exploiting the Congressional
Record, they identify \partisan" words and phrases { i.e., those expressions that show the
largest dierence in the frequency of use between Democratic and Republican representatives.
They then measure how frequently these expressions appear in a very large sample of news-
papers. They conclude that the partisan bias of newspapers depends mainly on consumers'
ideological leaning and far less on the identity of owners. Newspapers adopting a liberal
(conservative) language sell more copies in ZIP codes that are more liberal (conservative),
as proxied by the propensity of their inhabitants to donate to Republican or Democratic
candidates. On the other hand, once geographical factors are accounted for, the ideological
slant of a given newspaper is not signicantly correlated with the average ideological slant
of those belonging to the same chain.
The second approach to measuring the implicit political positions of media outlets is
based on studying variation in the intensity with which they cover dierent topics, or by
studying variation in the tone of this coverage.
Puglisi [2006] provides an account of the agenda setting behavior of the New York Times
in the period 1946-1997. He nds that the Times displays pro-Democratic partisanship, with
some watchdog aspects, in that, during presidential campaigns, it systematically gives more
coverage to Democratic topics (civil rights, health care, labor and social welfare) when the
incumbent president is a Republican.9 The New York Times displays a more symmetric type
8Gasper [2007] explores the robustness of the Groseclose and Milyo ndings. He argues that their con-
clusions are robust to dierent measures of the ideological positions of senators and congressmen, but not
to the time window being considered. In particular, the average estimated ideological position of the media
shifts to the right if one uses more recent time windows.
9In accord with the theory of issue ownership, as pioneered by Petrocik [1996], an issue is said to be
\Democratic" (or owned by the Democratic party) if the majority of citizens stably believes that Democratic
politicians would be better than Republican ones at handling problems related to it.
9of watchdog behavior after 1960: over the last four decades, during presidential campaigns
the Times also gives more coverage to the typically Republican issue of Defense when the
incumbent president is a Democrat, and less so when the incumbent is a Republican.
Larcinese et al. [2007] analyse the coverage of economic issues by a large sample of U.S.
newspapers during the last decade. They study whether there is any signicant correlation
between the endorsement policy of newspapers, and the dierential coverage of bad/good
economic news as a function of the political aliation of the incumbent president. They
nd evidence that newspapers with pro-Democratic endorsement pattern systematically give
more coverage to high unemployment when the incumbent president is a Republican than
when the president is Democratic, compared to newspapers with pro-Republican endorse-
ment pattern. Once controlling for the endorsement behavior of newspapers, the partisan
coverage of unemployment is not driven by the partisanship of readers. On the other hand,
there is no evidence of a partisan bias that is correlated with the endorsement policy for
stories on ination, budget decit or trade decit.
The papers by Puglisi [2006] and Larcinese et al. [2007] investigate the agenda-setting
behavior of media outlets, i.e. the amount of coverage devoted to dierent issues.10 Other
papers examine bias in the \tone" of coverage. For example, Lott and Hassett [2004] ana-
lyze newspaper coverage when ocial data about various economic indicators are released.
They code the tone { positive or negative { of newspaper headlines, and relate this to the
partisanship of the sitting president. Controlling for the economic data being released, they
nd that there are between 9.6 and 14.7 percent fewer positive stories when the incumbent
president is a Republican.
10The theory of agenda-setting eects, as pioneered by the study by McCombs and Shaw [1972] on Chapel
Hill voters during the 1968 presidential campaign, posits that the amount of coverage devoted to an issue by
the media can inuence the importance readers and viewers attach to that issue. See Iyengar et al. [1982]
for some experimental evidence on this. As noted by McCombs [2002], not only can mass media coverage
highlight some topic as an object of attention, but the coverage can also emphasize particular attributes
of the topic, making these attributes more salient. The theory of issue priming describes how readers and
viewers, when assessing a given situation or individual, are pushed towards giving a higher weight to the
aspect emphasized by the mass media. See Krosnick and Miller [1996] for a review of this literature.
10Finally, a few studies attempt to determine whether media bias aects political attitudes
and decisions. In addition to the literature in communications studies on agenda-setting
and framing eects, there are some recent papers examining the eects of variation in the
diusion of given media outlets, whose political position is assumed to be known. Gerber,
Karlan and Bergan [2006] conducted a randomized eld experiment just before the November
2005 gubernatorial election in Virginia. In the experiment, some households received a free
subscription to the Washington Post, others received a free subscription to the Washington
Times, and others received no free newpaper. DellaVigna and Kaplan [2007] use instead
a quasi-experimental approach, and exploit the gradual introduction of Fox News in cable
markets, in order to estimate its impact on the vote share in presidential elections between
1996 and 2000.
With respect to research on media coverage of political scandals, the Watergate aair
looms large. Watergate stimulated considerable interest in how scandals are covered { and
sometimes even uncovered { by the mass media. The causes and consequences of Watergate
have been widely investigated (e.g., Bernstein [1976], Chomsky [1973], Lang and Lang [1980],
Lipset and Raab [1973], Schrag [1974] and Zimmer [1979]), and in some cases Watergate
is used as a benchmark against which other scandals are to be compared (Szasz [1986]).
One issue debated in the political science and communications literatures is whether the
mass media act as ecient watchdogs in their coverage of political scandals, or whether they
instead inject an excessive dose of sensationalism, making the public skeptical and ultimately
cynical and unresponsive (Francke [1995], Balkin [1999], Bennett and Serrin [2005]).
A related issue, which is the explicit focus of our empirical analysis, is whether the
coverage of scandals is partisan or balanced. Regarding this question, the closest contribution
to ours is the historical analysis by Gentzkow et al. [2006] on how U.S. newspapers covered
the Cr edit Mobilier scandal in the early 1870s and the Teapot Dome scandal in the 1920s.
The authors note that in the period between these scandals technological progress in the
printing industry, coupled with the contemporaneous increase in the population and income
11of U.S. cities, induced an enormous growth in the size of the newspapers' market, with
subscriptions climbing from 2.6 millions in 1870 to 33 millions in 1920. In the competition
for market shares and advertising revenue, newspapers faced strong incentives to cut the
ties with political parties and become (at least formally) independent.11 The authors nd
that the coverage of the Cr edit Mobilier scandal { which occured in a period dominated by
partisan newspapers { was more biased than the coverage of Teapot Dome { which occured
at a time when fewer dailies were directly linked to political parties. They also nd some
evidence that the coverage of the Cr edit Mobilier scandal was less biased for newspapers
with higher circulation.12
Our contribution to this literature is to analyse the coverage devoted to a large number
of recent political scandals by a large set of newspapers. By using automatic keyword-based
searches, we are thus able to oer a replicable and more precise estimation of the agenda-
setting bias on an extremely contentious, salient, and important topic. In addition, we
match the data on coverage with measures of endorsement and reader partisanship, allowing
us to investigate the comparative impact of demand and supply factors in explaining slanted
coverage.
Our paper also makes a methodological contribution. Antweiler and Frank [2005] argue
that automated text-classication procedures allow researchers to investigate a comprehen-
sive dataset of news items, possibly the entire population of interest. Because of its cost,
studies employing human-based content analysis must instead focus on a small subset of the
relevant population { in our case, this would likely mean limiting attention to a few scandals
by a small number of media outlets. This may increase the risk of various biases, including
publication bias { i.e., the tendency to over-publish signicant and seemingly interesting
results. As Antweiler and Frank point out, researchers and scientic journal editors enjoy
considerable freedom to engage in cherry-picking, because the universe of studies employ-
11See Petrova [2007] for an explicit empirical analysis of the link between potential advertising revenue
across U.S. cities and entry/exit of partisan and independent newspapers during the 19th century.
12The relationship was not statistically signicant except when they excluded the New York Herald.
12ing human-based content analysis is so large. The comprehensive data treatment allowed
by automated procedures reduces this type of bias, by sharply restricting the \degrees of
freedom" available to the researcher. In our case, for example, we simply choose to focus
on recent and salient political scandals in the U.S. involving a particular class of politicians
(members of congress and top statewide ocials). Once we have made this choice, we mea-
sure the coverage of all scandals satisfying the selected criteria on all newspapers that are
available in the NewsLibrary archive (plus the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune and
Los Angeles Times, which we add because they are the largest newspapers in the U.S. that
endorse candidates but are not searchable through NewsLibrary).
3 Data and Measures
In the analysis that follows we focus on recent political scandals involving U.S. senators, con-
gressmen, governors and high-ranking members of the administration (plus one especially
prominent lobbyist, Jack Abramo). Table 1 presents an overview of those scandals, giving
the position, state of origin, political aliation of the persons involved, and a brief descrip-
tion of each scandal. Our sample comprises 14 scandals involving Democratic politicians,
and 21 involving Republicans. All scandals in the sample involved a prominent federal or
state investigation, and many resulted in indictments and felony convictions. On the Demo-
cratic scandals we see Robert Torricelli (Sen-NJ) and William Jeerson (Rep-LA) accused of
accepting bribes, and Don Siegelman (Gov-AL) convicted of racketeering and extortion. On
the Republican side, we see Bill Frist (Sen-TN, Majority Leader) accused of insider trading,
Tom DeLay (Rep-TX, Majority Leader) charged with accepting illegal corporate donations
and money laundering, and Randy \Duke" Cunningham (Rep-CA) convicted of soliciting
and accepting bribes.
For each of these 35 scandals, we collected data from the NewsLibrary electronic archive,
recording the total number of articles mentioning the person involved in each available news-
13paper during a xed time window.13 The time window for each scandal begins on the rst
day of the month prior to an announced investigation by a federal agency, a congressional
ethics committee, or a state attorney general, and ends at the end of the month in which the
person involved was convicted or acquitted (if this occured), or at the end of the month in
which the investigation formally ended (if this occurred), or at the end of the month when
the member lost reelection or resigned (if this occured), or on June 30, 2007 if the investi-
gation was still ongoing at that date.14 The politicians in our sample have prominent public
roles which make them newsworthy for a variety of reasons. In order to restrict attention to
articles covering the scandals themselves, we code an article as being about the scandal if the
name of the person involved appears together with the one or more of the following words
(*'s are wildcards): investigat*, indict*, convict*, guilty, resign*, brib*, ethic*, corrupt*,
conspir*, prison, scandal*. To nd opinion articles we added the following qualiers to the
\Topic" and \Section" elds in the search: opinion, editorial, comment, commentary, per-
spective, viewpoint, forum, ideas, citizen voices, sunday punch.15 We dene \news" articles
all non-opinion articles.16
Since newspapers vary greatly in size cross-sectionally (total number of pages, stories,
and words), and can also vary in size over time, we focus on the relative frequency of articles
about a scandal in each newspaper during the relevant time window. In order to do so, we
proxy the total number of articles in each newspaper in each time period by running a search
on the word \and". We do the same for opinion pieces, by adding the qualiers listed above
to the \Topic" and \Section" elds when searching for the word \and".
The rst half of Table 2 displays summary statistics on scandal coverage for those news-
papers that we were able to match with endorsement data. We express relative frequencies
13As mentioned above, we use the newspapers' own archives to add data on the Los Angeles Times and
the Chicago Tribune, and the Factiva archive for the New York Times.
14Most federal investigations are by the FBI, but the SEC and IRS are also involved in some cases.
15This failed to nd the editorial page for a few newspapers, so we dropped these from the analysis.
16Regarding the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune, the online archives
allow to explicitly restrict the searches to the editorial page: we directly follow this simpler route to retrieve
opinion pieces.
14of stories in percentage points, and distinguish between total hits, articles and editorials.
Overall, scandal stories make up a very small fraction of the total: on average there are
around two and a half hits every 10,000 stories. This gure is much higher for editorials
(something more than one editorial every 1,000). For all three categories of hits, the distri-
bution is strongly skewed to the right, as witnessed by large dierence between mean and
median.
In order to control for the relative localness of a scandal, we construct the dummy variable
Instate, which equals one when the politician involved in scandal i is from the state where
newspaper j is located. In a similar fashion Local is a dummy which equals one when the
politician involved in scandal i is from a congressional district that overlaps heavily with
the market area of newspaper j (for congressional scandals). Summary statistics on these
variables are again reported in the rst half of Table 2.
As mentioned, we match data on the coverage of scandals with information on the en-
dorsement propensity of each newspaper. The main source of endorsement data is An-
solabehere et al. [2006], which we supplement with additional information obtained via
searches on the NewsLibrary archive.17
We dene the \partisan bias" of a newspaper as the propensity for the newspaper to
endorse one of the parties during electoral campaigns, controlling for the quality of candidates
and their incumbency status. We used a linear regression model to estimate these biases.





1 if newspaper j endorses Democrat for oce i in year t
 1 if newspaper j endorses Republican for oce i in year t
0 if newspaper j explicitly makes no endorsement for oce i in year t
measure the endorsement behavior by each newspaper endorsing a candidate in a race (ex-
17A few newspapers have an explicit policy not to endorse candidates for political oces { e.g. the Deseret
News in Salt Lake City, the Orange County Register, and the Colorado Springs Gazette. In addition, many
smaller dailies do not bother to make political endorsements.





1 if Democrat for oce i in year t is only incumbent
 1 if Republican for oce i in year t is only incumbent
0 if otherwise
measure the incumbency status of the candidates in each race.19 Finally, we use previous
electoral experience to measure the quality of non-incumbents. To be more specic, dene a
\high-quality" candidate as a candidate who currently holds a U.S. House seat or an elected





1 if Democrat for oce i in year t is only high quality non-incumbent
 1 if Republican for oce i in year t is only high quality non-incumbent
0 otherwise
We estimated the following linear model for the period 1992-2006, exploiting the panel nature
of the data:
Eijt = NEj + t + 1Iijt + 2Qijt + ijt (1)
The newspaper-specic xed eects, NEj, capture newspapers' partisanship.20
Overall, we have sucient data on both endorsements and scandal coverage for 213
newspapers.21
We measure of the average partisanship of each newspapers' readers as follows. First,
for each county c we compute Dc as the average Democratic vote share in the presidential,
senatorial and gubernatorial elections between 1990 and 2000. Then, for each newspaper j
we compute NRj as a weighted average of the Dc's, weighting each county by the relative
sales of newspaper j in that county. We call this variable NRj. Figure 1 displays a scatter
18Our sample contains a few cases where a newspaper endorsed both candidates in a race. We drop these
from our analysis.
19After redistricting there are some U.S. House races with two incumbents running. In these cases we set
Iijt = 0. There are a few such cases in our sample, and if we drop them the results are unchanged.
20The panel is unbalanced, since in the earlier years some newspapers lack endorsement data. The model
also includes year xed-eects, t, which are meant to capture partisan tides.
21When matching coverage and endorsement data, newspapers under a joint operating agreement are
tricky cases. These agreements typically imply that the news section is common among participants, while
the editorial sections are separate. However, in four such instances the NewsLibrary archive reports data for
only one outlet. We dropped those cases (i.e. eight outlets).
16plot of the endorsement partisanship NEj against readers' ideology NRj, together with the
estimated regression line. As one might expect, there is a statistically signicant correlation
between the ideological stance of the demand and the supply side. But the correlation is
only :28, which is not overwhelming. Evidently, there is a lot of \slack" between the partisan
positions of news consumers and news providers.
We measure the relative percentage of moderates (or partisan independents) among each
newspapers' readers in a similar fashion. First, for each county c we compute sdc as the
standard deviation of the Democratic vote share in the presidential, senatorial and guberna-
torial elections between 1990 and 2000.22 Then, for each newspaper j we compute NR sdj
as a weighted average of the sdc's, again weighting each county by j's relative sales in the
county.
We measure newspaper size as the average annual circulation during the period 1996-
2002.
Finally, to measure the competitive pressure facing each newspaper in its relevant mar-
kets, we again use data from 1996 to 2002 and proceed as follows. Let sjct be the share of
copies sold by newspaper j in county c during year t. Our index is based on the probability
of a random meeting between an individual living in county j who reads newspaper j with
another individual living in the county who reads a dierent newspaper. This probability
is sjct(1 sjct). We average this across years and weight it by the relative sales of each
newspaper in each county. Call this measure Competj.
Summary statistics for all independent variables are reported in Table 2.
22The standard deviation is widely used as a proxy for the relative share of independents or moderates
in states, districts, and counties. This measure was introduced by Wright [1974]. See also Wallis [1984].
An area where the vote exhibits large uctuations between the two parties presumably has a large share
of independents or moderates, since loyal partisans and ideological extremists will rarely change their vote
between elections.
174 Two-Stage Analysis
We begin with a simple and intuitive two-stage analysis. First we separately estimate
newspaper-specic propensities to cover Democratic and Republican scandals, controlling
for factors such as whether the scandal involves a politician from the same state or city as
the newspaper. Then we regress the dierence in these estimated propensities against our
measures of endorsement partisanship and reader partisanship.
More precisely, for each Democratic scandal i = 1;:::;14, let nD
ij be the relative frequency
of articles published by newspaper j about scandal i during the relevant time window.
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ne nR
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i are scandal-specic xed eects; D
j and R
j are newspaper-specic xed
eects; the Instate and the Local dummy variables are described above. Since we have data
not only on the overall coverage of scandals on the newspaper, but separate information on
the coverage devoted on the editorial page and on the news section, we can perform these
regressions on three dierent items: relative frequencies of total hits, relative frequencies of
news hits, and relative frequencies of opinion hits.
Our focus is on the dierential coverage of Republican and Democratic scandals by the
dierent newspapers, which we can compute from the newspaper-specic xed eects. Let
^ sj  ^ R
j   ^ D
j measure the degree to which newspaper j exhibits a relatively pro-Democratic
bias in its scandal coverage.23
Once we obtain these newspaper-specic measures of slanted coverage, we check whether
and how they correlate with the explicit partisan position of each newspaper, as proxied by
23Note that this is only a relative measure { we do not make any claims about the absolute ideological
position of media outlets.
18its endorsement pattern, and with the political leaning of consumers. The results of this
exercise (with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors) are shown in Table 3. We present
results for three dependent variables: total hits, news hits and editorial hits. For each
dependent variable we present the results of four regressions: in the rst we simply regress
^ sj against the endorsement partisanship NEj and a constant, in the second we do the same
with reader partisanship NRj, in the third we control for both NEj and NRj, and in the
fourth we add total average circulation as an additional control, expressed in thousands of
yearly copies.
The main nding is that pro-Democratic coverage of scandals is signicantly and pos-
itively correlated with a pro-Democratic endorsement pattern: newspapers with a higher
propensity to endorse Democratic candidates give relatively more coverage to scandals involv-
ing Republican politicians than scandals involving Democratic politicians, while Republican-
leaning newspapers do the opposite. This is robust across specications, and is consistent
with supply-driven models of media bias.
Regarding the partisanship of demand, there is no statistically signicant relationship
with the dependent variable. However, when controlling for endorsement partisanship the
point estimate suggests that the Democratic partisanship of readers is negatively corre-
lated with pro-Democratic coverage of scandals.24 Thus, the results do not lend support
to demand-driven theories of media bias, which predict that slanted coverage should be in
tune with the a priori views of consumers.
As discussed at the end of section 2.1, competitive pressure in the media market should
compress the bias in coverage if the latter originates from the ideological position on the
supply side. The same is true if newspapers face Bayesian consumers who are uncertain
about the quality of news reporting, as in Gentzkow and Shapiro [2006]. On the other hand,
competition would exacerbate bias if newspapers cater to conrmation-seeking readers.
To shed some empirical light on these contrasting predictions, we checked whether the
24This correlation is not far away from mild signicance when controlling for total circulation.
19partial correlation of ^ sj with our measures of endorsement and reader partisanship is weaker
or stronger in more competitive media environments. We consistently nd a negative rela-
tionship { implying that more competition reduces supply-led bias { but the coecients are
rarely statistically signicant (at the .05 level).25
4.1 Overall coverage of scandals
As discussed in section 2.1, if demand for information by consumers is what drives mass
media behavior, then newspapers appealing to moderate voters should devote more total
coverage to political scandals, irrespective of the political aliation of the public ocials
involved. Also, there are reasonable conditions under which newspapers that are read by
larger and ideologically more heterogeneous audiences would nd it protable to cover all
scandals, in order to satisfy (to some extent) all customers.
In this section we again adopt a two stage approach, but the focus of the analysis is
on overall coverage. Let nij be the relative frequency of articles about scandal i being
published by newspaper j during the relevant time period: dierently from the previous
section, we jointly look at Democratic and Republican scandals and run the following panel
data regression:
nij = i + j + 1Instateij + 2Localij + ij (4)
where i and j are scandal-specic and newspaper-specic xed eects, respectively. As
before, we control for the geographical proximity of each scandal. In the second stage, the
estimated js are regressed against a set of newspaper-specic variables. Controlling for
endorsement and reader partisanship, our focus is on the partial correlation with average
yearly circulation (here expressed in thousand of copies) and NR sdj.
The results are presented in Table 4, where we again distinguish between total hits, news
articles, and editorials. For each category of news items, we rst control for circulation only,
25As often occurs with interacted variables, our data exhibit a substantial amount of multicollinearity,
making it dicult to disentangle the role played by competitive forces in determining slanted coverage.
20then add the voter standard deviation variable.26
The patterns are consistent. Overall coverage of scandals is signicantly higher for news-
papers with higher circulation. This is also true for news articles, but not for editorials.27
5 One-Stage Analysis
In this section we pool all of the data and perform a one-stage analysis with interaction
terms. This is an alternative and more direct way to estimate whether the coverage of
Democratic and Republican scandals of the various newspapers diers as a function of the
endorsement score and the ideological leaning of readers. It also allows to delve further into
the data, and investigate whether demand-driven or supply-led coverage bias is a function
of specic features of the scandals themselves, such as their location.
Since we are exploiting the dierential coverage of Republican and Democratic scandals
by each newspaper, it is possible to include newspaper-specic xed eects. More specically,
we run the following regression:
nij = i + j + (NEjRSi) + 1Instateij + 2Localij + ij (5)
where RSi is a dummy which equals one when scandal i involves a Republican politician,
and minus one when it involves a Democrat. We also run a regression in which we instead
control for the interaction with the reader partisanship variable NRj, and a third one where
both interactions are included. In a fourth specication we check whether the slant in the
coverage of scandals depends on the localness of the scandal itself. We do so by adding two
triple interactions between NEj (NRj), RSi and a dummy which equals one if the politician
involved in scandal i is from the state where newspaper j is located or from a congressional
26All of the specications in Table 4 also include the endorsement and reader partisanship variables. We
also ran specications omitting those variables and the results are quite similar to those reported in the
table.
27We also examine the eect of competition on total scandal coverage. We consistently nd a negative rela-
tionship between competitiveness and overall coverage, but the estimated coecients are seldom statistically
signicant (at the .05 level).
21district that overlaps heavily with the market area of newspaper j.28
As in the previous section we separately consider total hits, news articles and editorials.
Also, to account for the possibility that the error terms across observations are correlated
within newspapers, we compute standard errors that are clustered by newspaper.
The results are shown in Table 5. The relative frequency of hits { for total hits, news
hits, and editorial hits { is always positively and signicantly correlated with the interaction
between the endorsement score and the Republican scandal dummy. This corresponds to
what we found in the two stage analysis. Moreover, the interaction between the partisanship
of readers and the Republican dummy is negatively correlated with nij, although this coe-
cient is statistically insignicant. However, when allowing for a dierential partisan behavior
for local and non local scandals, we nd that newspapers mainly read in Democratic (Re-
publican) areas devote signicantly more coverage only to those Republican (Democratic)
scandals which involve local politicians. Interestingly, this demand-driven coverage bias does
not occur on the editorial page, but only in the news section (and with total hits, as the latter
eect dominates the former). On the other hand, supply-led coverage bias is not conned to
local scandals, as shown by the positive and statistically signicant coecient on the simple
interaction between NEj and RSi. The triple interaction of NEj with the localness dummy
is positive, but not signicant.
A plausible interpretation of these results is that newspapers would pander to the ideo-
logical tastes of readers only by slanting news material which is already known to them.29
On the other hand, editors and journalists pursuing a partisan bias in their coverage appear
to be making use of any news material that is suitable to the purpose, whether local or not.
The coecient on the interaction term between NEj and RSi provides us with an estimate
28In other terms, this dummy equals one when the Instate or the Local dummies are equal to one, and
zero otherwise.
29These results are also consistent with the existence of \favorable relationships" between newspapers and
local politicians. On average, in a Democratic area the Democratic candidates may have well established
relationships with the local people, including local newspapers owners and editors. These owners and editors
might in turn show their friendship by suppressing coverage of scandals involving the local politicians. This
is of course a supply side factor.
22of the dierential coverage of Republican versus Democratic scandals by newspapers with
dierent endorsement scores. Since the Republican scandal dummy takes on the values 1
and  1, by multiplying the estimated coecient by two and by the standard deviation of
NEj (which equals 0:381), we obtain a measure of this dierential coverage for newspapers
that are one standard deviation apart on this endorsement dimension. In turn, we can divide
this eect by the average fraction of hits, articles and editorials in our sample, in order to
compute a relative measure of coverage bias. Doing this implies that a newspaper with an
endorsement score which is one standard deviation more Democratic-leaning than another
would dedicate 26 percent more coverage to Republican than to Democratic scandals.30 This
eect is 30 percent for articles and 23 percent for editorials. A standard deviation in the
endorsement score is what roughly separates the Chicago Tribune (NEj =  0:2498) from
the Denver Post (NEj = 0:1373), and in turn the Denver Post from the New York Times
(NEj = 0:4913).
In a parallel fashion, we can implement a one-stage analysis of the overall coverage
of scandals. Since our focus in this case is on newspaper-specic variables such as total
circulation and reader moderateness, we cannot use xed eects at the newspaper level.
Instead, we run the following regression:
nij = i + 1Circj + 2NR sdj + (NEjRSi) + (NRjRSi)
+ 1Instateij + 2Localij + ij (6)
Again, we estimate the partisan coverage of scandals by interacting the Republican scandal
dummy with NRj and NEj. Standard errors are again clustered at the newspaper level.
Table 6 displays the results. For each category of hits (total hits, articles and editorials)
in the rst specication we include only the circulation measure; we then add voter standard
deviation. As in the two stage analysis, circulation is positively and signicantly correlated
with overall coverage in the case of total hits and news hits, but it is not signicant for
30The calculation is 0:00920:381
0:0264  0:259.
23editorials. On the other hand, voter standard deviation is positively and insignicantly
correlated with coverage. The only exception is with editorials, where the relationship is
positive and statistically signicant. Finally, it is still the case that the interaction between
endorsement partisanship and the Republican scandal dummy is positively and signicantly
correlated with coverage, while the interaction with reader partisanship is negatively and
insignicantly correlated.
5.1 Robustness checks
In this section we explore the robustness of our ndings, in particular of those regarding
coverage bias. The scandals we analyze are characterised by some degree of heterogeneity.
This is not altogether undesirable, since we are interested in a comprehensive investigation
of coverage bias, and thus we care about the average behavior of newspapers across scandals
of dierent types. On the other hand, one might be concerned that this average behavior is
in fact a combination of largely dierent \treatments" newspapers devote to dierent types
of scandals. Note, for example, that we have already found evidence that newspapers cater
to partisan tastes of readers only when scandals involve local politicians.
The time periods of the various scandals is a rst source of heterogeneity. In our case, all
scandals except those involving Democratic politicians James Tracant (Rep-OH) and Edwin
Edwards (Gov-LA) began after George W. Bush became president in 2000. A potential
concern is that newspapers might be dierentially covering political scandals as a function
of the match between their political aliation (as proxied by the endorsement score) and
the overall partisan climate at the federal level, which is of course heavily inuenced by
the political aliation of the incumbent president. If, for example, newspapers are more
aggressive in the bias of their coverage of scandals when the president belongs to the least
favorite political party, then the average dierential coverage of scandals might change when
the president changes. This would not aect our estimates of the relative partisan bias,
but one cannot exclude the further possibility that Democratic-endorsing and Republican-
24endorsing outlets react to a change in the political aliation of the president with a dierent
degree of aggressiveness, hence confounding our results.
Again separately displaying results for total hits, news articles and opinion pieces, Table
7 presents the outcome of this robustness check in the rst column of each subgroup, whereas
we exclude the Tracant and Edwards scandals from the analysis. Throughout, we adopt the
more general specication where we jointly control for endorsement and reader partisanship.
The results are very close { in terms of magnitude and statistical signicance { to those
reported in Table 5.
Scandals might also dier on the basis of whether they have been formally investigated
by a law-enforcement agency. In our sample there are three scandals which had not been
formally investigated (at the time of this writing) { i.e., those involving Katherine Harris
(Rep-R-FL), Dennis Hastert (Rep-R-IL) and Jim McGreevey (Gov-D-NJ). Similarly to the
argument stated above, one might be worried that newspapers systematically dier in the
amount of coverage they are willing to devote to scandals that are not formally investigated,
as a function of the match between their political aliation and that of the person involved.
For example, newspapers could cover scandals that are not under formal investigation and
that involve politicians on the opposite political side as vehemently as those which are for-
mally investigated, while they could be even more parsimonious in the coverage of \informal"
scandals, if they happen on their favorite political side. This would imply a more pronounced
coverage bias on informal scandals.
The second column in each subgroup in Table 7 displays the results of dropping these
cases. Again, the magnitude and statistical signicance of the coecients closely correspond
to the ones obtained with the baseline sample.
Up to now we have attached the same weight to all scandals within each party, irrespective
of the ideology of the politicians involved. However, it might be more rewarding for a
Democratic-leaning (Republican-leaning) newspaper to cover scandals involving staunchly
conservative Republicans (liberal Democrats) rather than moderate ones. This logic would
25also apply to demand-side forces driving newspapers to cater to conrmation-seeking readers.
Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) NOMINATE scores provide a widely used measure of the
ideological locations of all of the politicians who served in the U.S. Congress.31;32 For the 29
politicians to whom we can attach a NOMINATE common space score, we check whether
the amount of coverage devoted by a Democratic-endorsing newspaper to a given scandal
is increasing in the ideological conservativeness of the involved politician (as proxied by
the NOMINATE score), and vice versa for a Republican-endorsing newspaper. In order to
implement this type of analysis, we simply run a specication similar to (5), with the RSi
dummy replaced by the NOMINATE common space score.
The last column for each subgroup of news items in Table 7 reports the ndings of this
last robustness check. The interaction between the endorsement score and the NOMINATE
common space score has a positive and statistically signicant coecient (mildly so for
news articles), while the interaction of the latter with the reader partisanship variable is
negatively and insignicantly correlated with coverage, similarly to what found with the
baseline specication.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the coverage of political scandals by a large number of U.S.
newspapers, focusing on supply and demand side determinants of any partisan bias in this
coverage. As more thoroughly discussed in section 2.2, the use of automated keyword-based
searches of the online news archives (in our case: the NewsLibrary archive, plus Factiva
and the newspaper's own archive for the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the
31The idea behind NOMINATE scores is to retrieve the ideological position of congressmen in a possibly
multidimensional policy space on the basis of roll call votes cast (Poole and Rosenthal [1985], Poole and
Rosenthal [1997]). Since we must compare politicians belonging to dierent chambers and at dierent points
in time, we use the Common Space Scores (Poole [1998]), which are exactly designed to allow this type of
comparison.
32In addition to the politicians who were members of the U.S. Congress at the time of the scandal in
which they were involved, ve of the governors served in the Congress before their election as governor and
also have NOMINATE scores. They are Rod Blagojevich (D-IL), Edwin Edwards (D-LA), John Rowland
(R-CT), Ernie Fletcher (R-KY) and Jim Gibbons (R-NV).
26Chicago Tribune) allows us to systematically investigate how U.S. newspapers covered all
recent and salient political scandals, i.e. those involving senators, members of congress or
state governors (plus Jack Abramo).
The main nding is that the partisan leaning of the supply side has a strong correlation
with the dierential coverage of Democratic and Republican scandals: Democratic-leaning
newspapers { i.e., those with a higher propensity to endorse Democratic candidates in elec-
tions { give signicantly more coverage to scandals involving Republican politicians than
scandals involving Democratic politicians, while Republican-leaning newspapers behave in
the opposite way. This bias in the coverage of scandals is not conned to the editorial page,
but also aects the news section. While the fraction of stories devoted to political scandals
is on average very small, the magnitude of the coverage bias eect is very large in relative
terms: the dierential coverage of Republican versus Democratic scandals by a newspaper
with a propensity to endorse Democratic candidates which is one standard deviation higher
would be larger by around 26 percent.
On the other hand, we nd that biased coverage of scandals \panders" to the partisan
leaning of readers (as demand-driven models of mass media behavior by Mullainathan and
Shleifer [2005] and Gentzkow and Shapiro [2006] would suggest) only for those scandals
which are local { i.e. scandals involving politicians that are based in the same area where
the newspaper is sold. From this point of view, while supply-led coverage bias would make
use of any news material which is suitable to the purpose (i.e., any scandal on the opposite
political side, irrespective of the geographical location of those involved), slanted coverage
which caters to conrmation-seeking readers appears to be constrained by their ex ante
preferences, in this case an interest for local people and events.
We also nd some evidence regarding factors that are correlated with the overall coverage
of scandals. Newspapers with higher circulation systematically devote more coverage to
political scandals, at least in the news section. Further work is needed to distinguish between
demand-driven and supply-led accounts for this relationship.
27Finally, regarding the issue of competition, we nd no robust eects on bias or overall
coverage. This may be in due in part to the fact that in the period we study most U.S.
newspaper markets are relatively uncompetitive. Thus, it will be interesting to study earlier
time periods, when the number of newspapers was larger and there was probably more
variation in the degree of competition across cities. In addition, with historical data there
are potential quasi-experiments we can exploit to better identify the eects of competition
on media coverage. One is the demise of afternoon newspapers. Many scholars argue that
this was caused by the spread of television and/or lifestyle changes, and therefore the decline
can be treated as an exogenous shock to newspaper markets. If so, we can obtain a clean
estimate of the eects of competition by comparing changes in newspaper coverage across
cities with dierent initial numbers of afternoon newspapers.
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Figure 1: correlation between reader and endorsement partisanship
 Table 1: Summary of covered political scandals
Name Position State Party Scandal Under Investigation Time Window
James Traficant House Ohio D Bribery, false tax returns, racketeering, forcing aides to clean up his farm 1/1/1997 to 9/30/2002 
Frank Ballance House North Carolina D Money Laundering and other charges from funds as a State Senator Justice, December 2003 11/1/2003 to 1/31/2006 
Robert Torricelli Senate New Jersey D Bribery related to Chinese connections, acceptance of campaign gifts Senate Ethics Committee,
2002
4/1/2001 to 11/30/2002 
William Jefferson House Louisiana D Bribery, fraud FBI, as of July, 2005 6/1/2005 to 6/30/2007 
Jane Harman House California D Possible improper contact with AIPAC FBI in 2005 10/1/2006 to 6/30/2007 
Paul Kanjorski House Pennsylvania D Funnelling of money into family business FBI, 2002 2/1/2002 to 6/30/2007 
Robert Menendez Senate New Jersey D Conflict of interest problems dealing with renting out property to a nonprofit, as well as an
associate pressuring a psychiatrist involving hiring someone and prison contracts
8/1/2006 to 6/30/2007 
Alan Mollohan House West Virginia D Misrepresentation of private assets, earmarking funds to an aide FBI (possibly preliminary)
2006; Justice Department 
2/1/2006 to 6/30/2007 
Ed Mezvinsky House Iowa D Bank fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud 3/1/2001 to 1/31/2003 
Jim McDermott House Washington D Eavesdropping on Gingrich/Boehner conversation House Ethics 12/1/2004 to 12/31/2006 
Don Siegelman Governor Alabama D Racketeering and extortion dealing with HealthSouth and doctor's boards (as well as
trading favors for campaign contributions
Since '05 10/1/2005 to 6/30/2007 
Jim McGreevey Governor New Jersey D Investigation of qualifications of staff, as well as pay to play and eventually revelations
about his relations with his national security advisor
8/1/2004 to 12/31/2004 
Rod Blagojevich Governor Illinois D Kickback connections, hiring irregularities Justice has open
investigation (July 2006)
8/1/2005 to 6/30/2007 
Edwin Edwards Governor Louisiana D Racketeering, payoffs for casinos 1998 (Justice) 11/1/1998 to 1/31/2001 
Randy "Duke" Cunningham House California R Accepted $2.4 million in bribes and underreported income from dealings with MZM inc., a
defense contractor.
giu-05 5/1/2005 to 3/31/2006 
Bob Ney House Ohio R Abramoff-related May 2006 (House Ethics),
though investigation had 
10/1/2005 to 4/1/2007
Rick Renzi House Arizona R Bribery involving land swapping for copper mines, possible links to the US Attorneys probe,
also did not disclose $200k from business associate
2006-2007, Justice 10/1/2006 to 6/30/2007
John Doolittle House California R Abramoff-related, dealing with money given to wife for undefined work and Doolittle's work
to get Indian casino for Iowa tribe
FBI investigation, raid April
13
12/1/2004 to 6/30/2007 
Conrad Burns Senate Montana R Pay for play, Abramoff connections on getting money for Michigan Indian tribe Justice, November 2005 3/1/2005 to 11/31/2006 
Mark Foley House Florida R Inappropriate emails to Congressional Pages FBI and House Ethics
Investigations
9/1/2006 to 6/30/2007 
Tom DeLay House Texas R Illegal corporate donations through TRMPAC as part of redistricting plan, money
laundering, aides and personal connections to Jack Abramoff investigation
mag-05 4/1/2005 to 6/30/2007 
Bill Frist Senate Tennessee R Insider trading SEC, 2006 9/1/2005 to 5/31/2007 
Jim Kolbe House Arizona R Page-related trips Preliminary investigation in
October 2006
9/1/2006 to 6/30/2007 
Curt Weldon House Pennsylvania R Influence trading/bribery FBI, October 2006 10/1/2006 to 6/30/2007 
Jerry Lewis House California R Bribery dealing with ties to former Rep. Bill Lowery FBI 12/1/2005 to 6/30/2007 
Gary Miller House California R Failure to report land deals FBI 12/1/2006 to 6/30/2007 
Katherine Harris House Florida R Duke Cunningham-MZM related Inquiries and interviews
about money received from 
6/1/2005 to 11/31/2006 
Dennis Hastert House Illinois R Bribery, Abramoff-related FBI (Reported May 2006,
though Justice have denied 
5/1/2006 to 6/30/2007 
John Rowland Governor Connecticut R Corruption and fraud stemming from work done on his weekend cottage, as well as
dealings on a home in Washington
2003 (state and federal, with
state investigation 
11/1/2003 to 3/31/2005 
George Ryan Governor Illinois R Racketeering and corruption, illegal sales of government licenses, bribery to give truck
drivers jobs, payments to family and others for no work.
1/1/2000 to 9/30/2006 
Robert Taft Governor Ohio R Failure to disclose gifts and trips given by lobbyists 2005 6/1/2005 to 8/31/2005  
Ernie Fletcher Governor Kentucky R Merit system related corruption (hiring and firing based on political loyalty) State Attorney General (May
2005)
5/1/2005 to 8/31/2006 
Jim Gibbons House/Governor Nevada R Bribery (Gifts given for votes on Armed Services and Intelligence Committee) Justice Opened "a
preliminary corruption 
11/1/2006 to 6/30/2007 
Jack Abramoff Lobbyist R Defrauding of American Indian tribes and corruption of public officials 3/1/2004 to 6/30/2007 
I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby Chief of Staff, Vice
President
-R Perjury and involvement in the Valerie Plame CIA Leak Investigation October 21, 2003 (Justice) 10/1/2005 to 3/31/2007 Table 2: summary statistics on scandals coverage
Variable No of obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Scandal-newspaper level
relative frequency of scandal stories (total) 6881 0.0264 0.0026 0.1023 0 3.152
relative frequency of scandal articles 6880 0.0203 0.0007 0.0843 0 2.879
relative frequency of scandal editorials 6879 0.1213 0 0.4314 0 11.626
Instate 6881 0.0429 0 0.2026 0 1
Local 6881 0.0042 0 0.0648 0 1
Newspaper level
NE (newspaper endorsement score) 213 -0.0232 0.0287 0.381 -1.332 0.914
NR (newspaper readership score) 213 0.5007 0.4974 0.0821 0.2309 0.708
total circulation 213 150353 82004 167877 7293 1088391
NR_sd (standard deviation of Democratic vote) 213 0.0936 0.0909 0.0273 0.0311 0.1766
Compet (competition index) 207 0.1287 0.1202 0.0655 0.0124 0.25
Notes: all relative frequencies of stories are expressed in percentage points. The Instate dummy equals one when the politician involved in a scandal is from the
state where a newspaper is located. The Local dummy equals one when the politician involved in a scandal is from a congressional district that overlaps heavily with
the market area of newspaper (for congressional scandals). Table 3: agenda bias in the coverage of political scandals, two-stage analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
endorsement partisanship 0.015** - 0.017** 0.0159** 0.013** - 0.014** 0.0134** 0.060** - 0.066*** 0.0642**
[2.40] [2.44] [2.33] [2.50] [2.53] [2.40] [2.52] [2.61] [2.51]
reader partisanship - 0.005 -0.02 -0.0335 - 0.004 -0.017 -0.0295 - 0.012 -0.087 -0.1314
[0.24] [0.90] [1.58] [0.23] [0.90] [1.64] [0.14] [0.99] [1.49]
total circulation (hundred of thousands - - - 0.0030*** - - - 0.0028*** - - - 0.0097
[2.70] [2.94] [1.58]
constant 0.010*** 0.007 0.020* 0.0223** 0.008*** 0.006 0.017* 0.0190** 0.049*** 0.041 0.092** 0.0998**
[4.90] [0.72] [1.80] [2.04] [4.88] [0.71] [1.76] [2.03] [5.53] [0.95] [1.99] [2.17]
Observations 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213
R-squared 0.04 0 0.04 0.07 0.04 0 0.04 0.07 0.03 0 0.03 0.05
total hits articles editorials
In the first stage (not reported) the relative frequency of pieces, articles or editorials is regressed against newspaper-specific fixed effects, scandal-specific fixed effects and dummies for the localness of
the scandal. This is separately done for the coverage of Republican and Democratic scandals. In the regressions reported here, the dependent variable is the difference between the newspaper-specific
fixed effect in the coverage of Republican scandals minus the corresponding fixed effect in the coverage of Democratic ones. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, with t-statistics in brackets. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Table 4: overall coverage of political scandals, two-stage analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total circulation (hundreds of thousands) 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.007 0.008*
[3.67] [3.68] [4.27] [4.30] [1.65] [1.71]
standard deviation of Democratic vote - 0.012 - 0.019 - 0.206
[0.31] [0.53] [1.14]
endorsement partisanship 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.025 0.024
[1.38] [1.37] [1.42] [1.39] [1.37] [1.30]
reader partisanship -0.021 -0.02 -0.017 -0.017 -0.092 -0.083
[1.34] [1.31] [1.22] [1.16] [1.49] [1.34]
constant 0.014* 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.075** 0.052
[1.76] [1.39] [1.47] [1.00] [2.34] [1.29]
Observations 213 213 213 213 213 213
R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03
total hits articles editorials
In the first stage (not reported) the relative frequency of pieces, articles or editorials is regressed against newspaper-specific fixed
effects, scandal-specific fixed effects and dummies for the localness of the scandal. This is jointly done for the coverage of
Republican and Democratic scandals. In the regressions reported here, the dependent variable is the newspaper-specific fixed
effect as estimated in the first stage. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust, with t-statistics in brackets. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
endorsement score * Republican scandal dummy 0.009** - 0.009** 0.005*** 0.007** - 0.008** 0.005*** 0.033*** - 0.036*** 0.024***
[2.40] [2.42] [2.95] [2.48] [2.50] [2.77] [2.69] [2.77] [3.03]
- - - 0.118 - - - 0.099 - - - 0.399
[1.32] [1.33] [1.47]
reader partisanship * Republican scandal dummy - 0.004 -0.01 -0.021 - 0.003 -0.008 -0.018 - 0.013 -0.041 -0.066
[0.34] [0.82] [1.55] [0.34] [0.80] [1.58] [0.31] [0.92] [1.37]
- - - 0.094** - - - 0.087*** - - - 0.16
[2.35] [2.65] [0.97]
same state for involved politician and newspaper 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.181*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.144*** 0.779*** 0.778*** 0.779*** 0.768***
[6.80] [6.80] [6.80] [6.69] [6.65] [6.64] [6.65] [6.64] [6.73] [6.72] [6.73] [6.15]
0.143** 0.144** 0.143** 0.138** 0.114** 0.115** 0.114** 0.110** 0.629** 0.631** 0.627** 0.600**
[2.42] [2.43] [2.41] [2.41] [2.32] [2.34] [2.32] [2.32] [2.55] [2.56] [2.54] [2.50]
constant 0.101*** 0.050*** 0.043*** 0.036*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.351*** 0.344*** 0.372*** 0.381***
[4.68] [8.50] [6.43] [4.73] [29.67] [8.66] [6.60] [4.86] [4.52] [4.13] [4.50] [4.53]
newspaper fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
scandal fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 6881 6881 6881 6881 6880 6880 6880 6880 6879 6879 6879 6879
Number of newspapers 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213
R-squared 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.31 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35
The relative frequency of pieces, articles or editorials is regressed against newspaper-specific fixed effects, scandal-specific fixed effects, dummies for the localness of the scandal and an interaction between the
endorsement score and a "Republican scandal" dummy. This dummy equals one when the scandal involves a Republican politician, and minus one when it involves a Democrat. The same interaction is computed for the
reader partisanship variable. These interaction terms are further interacted with a dummy which equals one when the scandal is a local one. Standard errors are clustered at the newspaper level, with t-statistics in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Table 5: agenda bias in the coverage of political scandals, one-stage analysis
endorsement score * Republican scandal dummy * 
dummy for local scandals
reader partisanship * Republican scandal dummy * 
dummy for local scandals
same congressional district for involved politician and 
newspaper
total hits articles editorialsTable 6: overall coverage of political scandals, one-stage analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
total circulation (hundreds of thousands) 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.006 0.006
[3.31] [3.44] [4.00] [4.16] [1.32] [1.46]
standard deviation of Democratic vote - 0.062 - 0.057 - 0.414**
[1.42] [1.49] [2.31]
endorsement score * Republican scandal dummy 0.010** 0.010** 0.008** 0.008** 0.042*** 0.041***
[2.26] [2.26] [2.30] [2.29] [2.84] [2.82]
reader partisanship * Republican scandal dummy -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.013 -0.056 -0.054
[1.05] [1.03] [1.03] [1.01] [1.07] [1.03]
constant -0.005 -0.011 -0.004 -0.01 0.230*** 0.188**
[0.72] [1.19] [0.67] [1.22] [2.73] [2.37]
state fixed effects no no no no no no
newspaper fixed effects no no no no no no
dummies for scandal "localness" yes yes yes yes yes yes
scandal fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 6881 6881 6880 6880 6879 6879
Number of newspapers 213 213 213 213 213 213
R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.30 0.30
total hits articles editorials
The relative frequency of pieces, articles or editorials is regressed against scandal-specific fixed effects, dummies for the localness of the
scandal and an interaction between the endorsement score and a "Republican scandal" dummy. This dummy equals one when the scandal
involves a Republican politician, and minus one when it involves a Democrat. The same interaction is computed for the reader partisanship
variable. The focus is on total circulation of each newspaper and the standard deviation of the Democratic vote in the area where the
newspaper is sold. Standard errors are clustered at the newspaper level, with t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%. Table 7: robustness checks on agenda bias, one-stage analysis
endorsement score * Republican scandal variable 0.010** 0.009** 0.023** 0.008** 0.008** 0.018* 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.100**
[2.53] [2.32] [2.03] [2.59] [2.31] [1.93] [2.94] [2.92] [2.43]
reader partisanship * Republican scandal variable -0.009 -0.006 -0.003 -0.008 -0.004 0 -0.041 -0.033 -0.103
[0.74] [0.50] [0.07] [0.72] [0.43] [0.01] [0.91] [0.73] [0.77]
same state for involved politician and newspaper 0.198*** 0.203*** 0.142*** 0.159*** 0.164*** 0.113*** 0.796*** 0.805*** 0.572***
[6.63] [6.45] [5.72] [6.48] [6.35] [5.61] [6.59] [6.36] [5.98]
0.150** 0.129** 0.181*** 0.119** 0.105* 0.145*** 0.641** 0.528** 0.787***
[2.48] [1.98] [3.07] [2.38] [1.96] [2.98] [2.55] [2.05] [3.19]
0.057*** 0.106*** 0.064*** 0.046*** 0.089*** 0.052*** 0.379*** 0.370*** 0.254***
[8.74] [4.51] [12.57] [8.20] [4.44] [12.21] [4.66] [4.49] [8.60]
newspaper fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
scandal fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 6542 6298 5694 6541 6297 5694 6540 6296 5694
Number of newspapers 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213
Number of scandals 33 32 29 33 32 29 33 32 29
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The relative frequency of pieces, articles or editorials is regressed against newspaper-specific fixed effects, scandal-specific fixed effects, dummies for the localness of the scandal and an interaction
between the endorsement score and a "Republican scandal" dummy. This dummy equals one when the scandal involves a Republican politician, and minus one when it involves a Democrat. The
same interaction is computed for the reader partisanship variable. In the first column within each subgroup we restrict attention to recent scandals; in the second one we focus on formally investigated
scandals, while in the last one we interact the endorsement score (and the reader partisanship variable) with the NOMINATE common space score of the person involved, if available. Standard errors
are clustered at the newspaper level, with t-statistics in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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